Representative Bureaucracy and Specialist Knowledge in the European Commission. by Christensen, J. et al.
1 
 
Representative Bureaucracy and Specialist Knowledge in the European Commission 
 
Johan Christensen 
Petra van den Bekerom 
Joris van der Voet 
Leiden University, Institute of Public Administration, The Netherlands 
 
Corresponding author:  
Johan Christensen 
Institute of Public Administration 
Turfmarkt 99 
2511 DP The Hague 
The Netherlands 
Telephone: +31 708009408 
E-mail: j.christensen@fgga.leidenuniv.nl 
 
Published as: 
Christensen, J., Van den Bekerom, P., and Van der Voet, J. (2017). ‘Representative Bureaucracy 
and Specialist Knowledge in the European Commission’, Public Administration 95(2): 450-467.   
 
  
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
The article addresses an issue that has received little attention in the literature on representative 
bureaucracy, namely the relationship between representativeness and specialized expertise in 
public administration. While representation may strengthen the legitimacy of public 
bureaucracies, what implications does it have for expert knowledge in these organizations? This 
issue is examined by looking at the recruitment of civil servants to the European Commission, an 
international bureaucracy where the question of geographical representation is of fundamental 
importance. Based on a quantitative analysis of nearly 200 recruitment competitions to the 
organization from 1958 to 2015, the article finds that competitions related to EU enlargement 
where nationality was an explicit criterion put significantly less emphasis on specialist 
qualifications and knowledge than other competitions. This indicates a negative relationship 
between geographical representation and specialized expertise in recruitment to the European 
Commission. Implications for broader debates about representative bureaucracy and international 
public administrations are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Weberian model of bureaucracy has traditionally underpinned the structure and management 
of most public administrations. A core element of the Weberian model is that officials possess 
specialized expertise, that is, technical knowledge acquired through formal training, which Weber 
saw as the principal reason for the superior efficiency of bureaucracy as an organizational form 
(Weber 1947, pp. 337, 339). Yet, in recent decades, the Weberian conception of bureaucracy has 
been challenged, inter alia by ideas about representative bureaucracy. The representative 
bureaucracy literature is concerned with the extent to which public organizations are 
representative of the society that they serve (Groeneveld and Van de Walle 2010; Andrews and 
Ashworth 2015). It highlights how a representative composition of staff in public organizations 
may contribute to increased legitimacy and organizational performance (Groeneveld et al. 2016). 
However, these arguments inevitably raise questions about the place of specialized knowledge 
within a representative bureaucracy. Is representativeness beneficial or detrimental to expert 
knowledge in public organizations? Surprisingly, this issue has received limited attention in the 
representative bureaucracy literature. The aim of this study is therefore to shed light on the 
relationship between representation and specialized expertise in public administration. 
An interesting site for exploring this issue is international bureaucracies, the 
administrative bodies of international governmental organizations (Knill and Bauer 2016). 
Although there are few studies of international organizations in the representative bureaucracy 
literature (see Gravier 2013), geographical representation is of fundamental importance within 
international bureaucracies. To ensure fair representation of member states, international 
organizations typically integrate staff from a large number of countries in their administrative 
apparatus. Geographical representation may contribute to the legitimacy of these organizations, 
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by ensuring equal access to administrative positions for citizens from all member states and by 
strengthening the identification of national elites with the organization. It may also contribute to 
organizational performance by allowing the organization to draw on the knowledge of officials 
about political, administrative and societal features at the national level. Arguments about 
bureaucratic representation are particularly relevant to the European Union (EU), given the strong 
role of the executive bureaucracy in the organization. The executive body of the EU – the 
European Commission – enjoys considerable political power, including a near-monopoly on 
proposing legislation. Critics argue that the power of the executive and the weakness of 
parliamentary control has given rise to a lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU (see Follesdal 
and Hix 2006 for a review). In this kind of political system, bureaucratic representation may 
constitute an important supplement to political representation in terms of legitimacy (cf. 
Groeneveld et al. 2016). A couple of recent studies have indeed pointed to a clear rationale of 
bureaucratic representation in the European Commission’s policies for recruiting officials from 
new EU member states (Gravier 2008, 2013). Yet, we know little about what influence 
representativeness has had on other aspects of the European Commission bureaucracy, including 
the role of knowledge in the administration. How has the recurring need to integrate citizens from 
new member states affected the emphasis on specialized expertise in the Commission?  
This article addresses this issue by looking at the relationship between geographical 
representation and specialist knowledge criteria in centralized recruitment competitions to the 
European Commission. In the European Commission, most permanent officials are recruited 
through large-scale, publically advertised competitions organized periodically in a variety of 
fields, in which candidates are assessed based on educational qualifications and/or tests of 
different types of knowledge and skills (see Christensen 2015). The article examines the 
relationship between geographical representativeness and specialized expertise by systematically 
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comparing the emphasis on specialist qualifications and knowledge in two types of recruitment 
competitions: (1) competitions where nationality was an explicit criterion – that is, the ‘special 
enlargement competitions’ organized to recruit citizens from new member states – and (2) 
competitions that did not take nationality into account. The main objective of this analysis is to 
contribute to the representative bureaucracy literature by empirically assessing the relationship 
between representation and specialized knowledge in a public administration. The second aim is 
to add to existing work on representative bureaucracy in international organizations, in particular 
regarding the impact of geographical representation. The final objective is to contribute to the 
public administration literature about the EU by examining how a growing need for 
representation in the European Commission has affected its recruitment policies.  
The study examines the following research question: What is the relationship between 
geographical representation and specialist qualifications in the centralized recruitment 
competitions of the European Commission between 1958 and 2015? The analysis is based on a 
new dataset of nearly 200 recruitment competitions for the European Commission over a period 
of more than 50 years. The analysis shows that special enlargement competitions where 
nationality was an explicit criterion were significantly less likely to take educational 
qualifications into account and put significantly less emphasis on specialist knowledge in 
recruitment tests. Moreover, it shows that these effects were partly mediated by the 
administrative grade for which new entrants were sought and the defined field of recruitment. 
The article thus finds a negative relationship between geographical representativeness and 
specialist expertise in the recruitment policies of the European Commission. It argues that this 
relationship can be attributed to the greater perceived need for socializing officials from new 
member states into the norms of the organization (see Ban 2013), which entailed a greater 
emphasis on the ability of staff to fit into the organization than on their expert knowledge. The 
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article also discusses possible implications of these findings for other international bureaucracies 
and for the literature on representative bureaucracy. Moreover, it speculates whether there may be 
a link between the multinational character of the European Commission and the increasingly 
generalist character of its administration (see Wille 2013; Suvarierol et al. 2013; Christensen 
2015). 
The article proceeds as follows: In the next section, it contrasts the role of specialist 
knowledge in the Weberian and representative bureaucracy models, discusses geographical 
representation within the EU bureaucracy, and develops a theoretical framework and hypotheses 
about the relationship between representation and specialist knowledge in recruitment. It then 
explains the research design, including the process of data collection, measures and analytical 
strategy. This is followed by a presentation of the results. The article concludes with a discussion 
of the central findings, limitations, and theoretical and substantive implications of the study.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Representative bureaucracy and specialist expertise 
In the traditional Weberian model of bureaucracy, specialist expertise constitutes one of the basic 
characteristics. The specialization of administrative functions that lies at the core of the Weberian 
model presupposes that officials have relevant specialized expertise to carry out their tasks. 
‘Office management, at least all specialized office management,’ argued Weber, ‘usually 
presupposes thorough and expert training’ (Weber 1978, pp. 198, 200). In fact, Weber pointed to 
technical expertise as the principal reason for the superior efficiency of bureaucracy as compared 
to all other forms of organization: ‘The primary source of the superiority of bureaucratic 
administration lies in the role of technical knowledge […] Bureaucratic administration means 
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fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge’ (Weber 1947, pp. 337, 339). 
Weber’s conception of specialized expertise was based on his distinction between the ‘cultivated 
man’ and the ‘specialist type of man’ (see Weber 1978, pp. 423-26). Whereas the cultivated man 
has a general education meant to stimulate his cultural quality, the specialist has undergone 
rational and specialized expert training aimed at providing him with skills that are useful for 
administrative purposes. As such, the specialized expertise needed to work in the bureaucracy is 
directly linked to the possession of ‘educational certificates’ (Weber 1978, p. 200).  
Yet, beyond the efficiency of bureaucratic organization, Weber was also concerned about 
the democratic implications of this system. He saw an ambivalent relationship between 
specialized expertise in the bureaucracy and democratic or representative concerns. On the one 
hand, selection on the basis of qualifications meant ‘a ‘selection’ of those who qualify from all 
social strata rather than a rule by notables’ (Weber 1978, p. 240). Indeed, it has been noted how 
the introduction of Weberian meritocratic bureaucracy from the 19
th
 century onwards made 
public employment more representative by opening the way for the middle classes (Groeneveld 
and Van de Walle 2010). On the other hand, Weber pointed out that recruitment based on 
educational qualifications could create a ‘privileged caste’ of officials and exclude lower-
educated classes from the administration (Weber 1978, pp. 240-41). In other words, a 
bureaucracy made up of the higher educated might be efficient but not reflective of the 
population (Groeneveld and Van de Walle 2010, p. 255). 
 This concern with the representative character of the public service lies at the core of the 
literature on ‘representative bureaucracy’. The basic tenet of this literature is that public 
bureaucracies are more than tools for efficient administration; they are also institutions that 
should be representative of the society that they serve, for instance in terms of nationality, 
language, race, class or gender. Indeed, in many polities, representation in the non-elected public 
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service is as important as political representation in the legislature (Hood and Lodge 2006, p. 34). 
Representative bureaucracy arguments take several different forms (see Groeneveld and Van de 
Walle 2010 for a review). One is the long-standing interest in administrative representation as a 
tool for ensuring the authority and legitimacy of the state (Kingsley 1944; cf. Tilly 1975). This 
work emphasizes how ethnic, racial or language groups in society are granted access to the 
administrative apparatus in exchange for allegiance to the state (Hood and Lodge 2006, p. 13). 
The idea of bureaucratic representation as power-sharing is particularly relevant in polities with 
deep ethnic or racial cleavages, such as in a number of developing countries (Esman 1997). 
Second, bureaucratic representation has been seen as a mechanism to ensure equal opportunity 
(Groeneveld and Van de Walle 2010, p. 244). This view is rooted in the argument that 
bureaucrats often have considerable discretion when making decisions and that these choices 
depend on officials’ social-demographic background (Lipsky 1980; Meier and Bohte 2001). 
Representation in the public service thus gives disadvantaged groups the opportunity to voice and 
advance their interests. This is closely linked to the idea of active representation, that is, that 
bureaucrats actively represent the interests of their social group when making decisions, rather 
than simply reflecting the social-demographic make-up of the population (passive representation) 
(Mosher 1968). But representation as equal opportunity also has a more material side, namely 
that disadvantaged groups get access to public sector jobs. In both regards, ensuring equal 
opportunity is crucial for the legitimacy and credibility of the public service with citizens 
(Krislov 1974). Finally, recent work about representative bureaucracy highlights how diversity 
can contribute to the performance of public organizations (e.g. Groeneveld et al. 2016), for 
instance by positively influencing the interaction between street-level bureaucrats and clients. 
The representative bureaucracy literature thus advances an understanding of public 
bureaucracies that is distinct from the Weberian model. The ‘representational’ logic stands in 
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contrast to the idea of relying on public servants with special expert competence – who are ‘far 
from representative of the wider society’ (Hood and Lodge 2006, p. 38). Yet, surprisingly, the 
relationship between representation and expert knowledge has received limited attention in 
existing studies of representative bureaucracy (see, e.g. Kennedy 2014). To be sure, some 
arguments from this and related literatures touch upon the issue. In the diversity management 
literature, some scholars point to a ‘diversity-validity dilemma’ in personnel selection: selection 
procedures that provide valid indicators of job performance tend to disadvantage racial and 
ethnical minorities and women, and conversely, selection based on diversity makes it difficult to 
identify the best qualified candidates (e.g. Pyburn et al. 2008). Though relevant, this argument 
pertains to how selection procedures affect the success rates of different categories of individuals 
and not to the impact of representativeness at the organizational level. Moreover, it does not 
speak specifically to how representation may affect specialized knowledge. Regarding the 
relationship between representation and education, Carnevale notes how the underrepresentation 
of minorities in the US federal government is greater in positions that require a higher degree of 
technical or educational qualifications, because ethnic minorities are underrepresented in higher 
education (Carnevale 1991). Meier and Hawes similarly point out that the merit-based 
recruitment system for the higher echelons of the French administration has produced a highly 
unrepresentative bureaucratic elite (Meier and Hawes 2009). However, they reject the argument 
that governments need to lower recruitment standards in order to achieve a more representative 
bureaucracy, claiming instead that recruitment systems rarely provide valid measures of merit 
and often are biased in terms of social and racial background. ‘To the extent that representative 
bureaucracies can produce higher levels of overall benefits,’ they argue, ‘representative 
bureaucracies operationalize a more valid concept of merit than do more traditional procedures’ 
(Meier and Hawes 2009, p. 276). Yet, this argument seems to obscure the underlying issue. 
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While there may be different ideas about what constitutes ‘merit’ or ‘competence’ in 
bureaucracies, few would disagree that the specialized expertise of officials – defined through the 
possession of higher educational qualifications based on specialized training – constitutes one 
important aspect of an efficient public administration. In other words, while representativeness 
and specialized expertise both are important features of a bureaucracy that produces good 
decisions, it makes sense to keep the two dimensions analytically separate. This does not mean 
that representative bureaucracies cannot also have a high degree of specialized expertise. As this 
review of the existing literature has shown, the relationship between representation and 
specialized knowledge in bureaucracies may be either positive or negative. Before setting out our 
position in this debate, we discuss the role of representation in the executive bureaucracy of the 
EU. 
 
Representative bureaucracy in the European Commission 
The European Commission is the executive arm of the European Union, charged with initiating  
EU policies and promoting the European interest. The Commission is a supranational body, 
formally independent and organizationally separated from the Council of the European Union, 
which represents the EU member states. The Commission is headed by a college of politically 
appointed Commissioners, who are drawn from the member states but represent the European 
interest. The Commission has a highly developed permanent bureaucracy, which is divided into 
nearly forty departments (‘directorates-general’ or DGs). The Commission bureaucracy counts 
about 33.000 officials drawn from the 28 member states, of which nearly 12.000 are permanent 
‘AD’ level staff, that is, administrators with policy tasks.  
Most permanent Commission officials are recruited through centralized, open 
competitions for life-long careers within the administration, in accordance with the EU staff 
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regulations. Recruitment competitions are organized periodically in a variety of fields and for 
different administrative grades and involve assessment on the basis of educational qualifications 
and/or oral, written or practical tests (see Christensen 2015). Traditionally, each of the major EU 
institutions was in charge of its own recruitment (Ban 2010). In the Commission, the 
responsibility for staffing lay with DG Personnel and Administration, which determined the 
competition schedule and the modalities of the selection procedure (Desbois 2003). In 2003, the 
responsibility for organizing recruitment competitions for the Commission and the other major 
European institutions was transferred to a separate agency – the European Personnel Selection 
Office (EPSO). In EPSO, the principles for recruitment policy are decided by a management 
board made up of representatives from the EU institutions, acting on proposals from the head of 
EPSO (European Communities 2002). The management board makes these decisions by qualified 
majority voting. The Commission has a much greater number of votes than the other institutions, 
reflecting its status as the principal recipient of recruits (with about 70 percent of total positions 
in the EU administration [Ban 2010, p. 14]). 
 The role of nationality in the European Commission has been a central topic in the public 
administration literature about the EU. This work has focused primarily on whether Commission 
officials hold supranational or inter-governmentalist views, that is, whether they adhere to the 
supranational values of the Commission or rather emphasize national interests (e.g. Hooghe 
2005; Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Egeberg 2012; Kassim et al. 2013). Prominent themes in this 
literature are the multiple role identities or allegiances of officials working for the European 
institutions and how the relative salience of these identities is affected by organizational and 
institutional features. Yet, while clearly relevant to discussions about representative bureaucracy, 
this literature has not addressed the multinational character of the EU administration as a question 
of representation. 
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 With the exception of Magali Gravier’s recent work (Gravier 2008, 2013), no major 
studies have applied arguments about representative bureaucracy to the study of the Commission. 
This is surprising given the importance of geographical representation in the organization. In 
order to ensure fair representation of member states, the Commission has since the beginning 
needed to integrate staff from a number of different countries in its administrative apparatus 
(Page 1997; Egeberg 2006). This challenge has only grown with the gradual expansion of the 
European Union from its original six member states to its current 28 members (Christensen 
2015).  
Drawing on representative bureaucracy arguments, geographical representation in the 
European Commission can be seen to serve three principal functions. The first is the inclusion of 
national elites in the European institutions in order to create allegiance to the European project 
and shift identification to the European level (see Gravier 2013). The second is to ensure equal 
opportunities by giving citizens from new member states the possibility to participate in 
formulating EU policies and access to prestigious, secure and well-paid jobs in the EU 
institutions. Both elements may contribute positively towards the legitimacy and credibility of the 
EU. Enhancing legitimacy through bureaucratic representation may be particularly relevant given 
the power and autonomy of the executive bureaucracy in the EU (Egeberg 2006). The 
institutional design of the EU gives the Commission a near-monopoly on drafting and proposing 
legislation, whereas the mechanisms for parliamentary control are weak. It is often argued that a 
powerful bureaucracy insulated from the control of elected bodies has contributed to a 
‘democratic deficit’ in the EU (Follesdal and Hix 2006). In this kind of political system, making 
the executive bureaucracy itself more representative may be an important way to increase 
legitimacy, as a supplement to political representation (cf. Groeneveld et al. 2016). A third 
function of geographical representation may be to increase the performance of the EU 
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bureaucracy, for instance by allowing the administration to draw on the knowledge of citizens 
from new member states about the workings of national bureaucracies, legislation, languages, etc. 
It is worth noting that geographical representation in the Commission should be seen mainly as a 
form of passive representation (Gravier 2013). The staff regulations of the Commission explicitly 
state that officials shall act solely with the interests of the European Union in mind and prohibit 
officials from taking instruction from national governments. 
In a couple of recent articles, Magali Gravier analyses the issue of geographical 
representation in the recruitment policies of the European Commission (Gravier 2008, 2013). She 
points to the special recruitment competitions for citizens from new member states as evidence 
for the role of representative bureaucracy in the EU. Under its regular staffing policies, the 
Commission is not allowed to take nationality into account when recruiting civil servants. Yet, in 
the special competitions organized during enlargement, nationality is an explicit selection criteria. 
These competitions thus follow a clear ‘rationale of bureaucratic representation’ (Gravier 2008, 
p. 1026). As Gravier herself points out, her analyses only constitute a first step in the examination 
of representative bureaucracy in the EU. While she traces the presence of representativeness 
criteria in the Commission’s staff policies, she does not examine the implications of these 
representativeness criteria for other aspects of the Commission bureaucracy. Moreover, Gravier’s 
analyses are based on very limited empirical data, consisting of a few policy documents and 
aggregate recruitment numbers. While building on Gravier’s insights, this article takes the 
analysis of representative bureaucracy in the EU one step further. It not only develops a 
theoretical argument about the effects of geographical representation on the emphasis on 
specialist qualifications and skills in recruitment. It also tests this argument empirically using a 
new dataset of recruitment competitions for the European Commission, which allows for a 
systematic comparison of recruitment competitions where nationality was an explicit criterion 
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(i.e. enlargement competitions) and competitions that did not take nationality into account (i.e. 
regular competitions). The theoretical argument and hypotheses are spelled out in the next 
section. 
 
Representation and specialist expertise in recruitment to the European Commission 
Our theoretical argument about the relationship between geographical representativeness and 
specialist expertise in recruitment centers on the mechanism of organizational socialization. 
Organizational socialization can be understood as ‘the process by which an individual acquires 
the social knowledge and skills necessary to assume an organizational role’ (Van Maanen and 
Schein 1977). This not only means acquiring the requisite skills for performing a job but also 
adopting the culture and unwritten norms of the organization. This process starts even before the 
individual enters the organization, as prospective employees learn about the organization and go 
through the selection procedure (Ban 2013, p. 99). The recruitment stage is therefore a crucial 
site for the socialization of new employees.  
 Arguments about organizational socialization are particularly relevant to the European 
Commission given the strong values and mission of the organization. Studies of the Commission 
frequently point to the existence of a common organizational culture built around the idea of 
defending the supranational, European interest (Ellinas and Suleiman 2012, p. 4, see also Egeberg 
2006). To maintain such a culture in the face of changing organizational demographics, extensive 
organizational socialization is needed. This is illustrated in Carolyn Ban’s book about the EU’s 
Eastern enlargement in the 2000s, which uses organizational socialization as the primary 
theoretical lens for understanding how the Commission dealt with the organizational challenges 
related to enlargement (Ban 2013). 
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Building on this, we argue that the recruitment of officials from a range of countries with 
different backgrounds, cultures and languages entails a greater need for socializing candidates 
into the practices and norms of the organization, and that this emphasis on socialization may 
imply less attention to the educational qualifications and specialist knowledge of candidates. Not 
only may concerns about socialization imply a greater focus on testing organization-specific 
knowledge and the ability to fit into the organization and less emphasis on assessing specialist 
qualifications. It may also imply hiring new officials at the lowest possible administrative level 
and in generalist fields in order to increase the organization’s ability to socialize officials, which 
in turn implies a diminished emphasis on specialist qualifications and knowledge. As such, there 
may be a negative relationship between representativeness and the emphasis on specialist 
expertise in recruitment. The detailed mechanisms of this argument are specified in the 
theoretical expectations below. 
Our first theoretical expectation is that the emphasis on geographical representativeness in 
recruitment is negatively related to the emphasis on educational qualifications. In recruitment 
competitions where geographical representativeness is a criterion, we expect there to be a greater 
concern about socializing a heterogeneous population of candidates. For the European 
Commission, a principal challenge in the enlargement of the EU has been the need to integrate a 
large and diverse group of staff into the existing organization and its culture (Ban 2013). Next to 
having the required technical skills, the ability to adapt to and function in a multinational work 
environment has thus become an explicit part of the recruitment design of the Commission. This, 
we argue, implies a greater focus on testing organization-specific knowledge, general skills such 
as language skills and the ability to fit into the organization and, as a result, less emphasis on 
assessing specialist qualifications and knowledge. We thus formulate hypotheses 1 and 2: 
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Hypothesis 1: Geographical representativeness is negatively related to the emphasis on 
educational qualifications in a recruitment competition. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Geographical representativeness is negatively related to the specialist content of 
tests that are used in a recruitment competition. 
 
Apart from the direct negative relationships between geographical representativeness and 
specialist expertise, this relationship can be explained by the characteristics of the candidates to 
which the recruitment competition is tailored. A first such characteristic is the administrative 
grade for which officials are sought. Recruitment competitions for the European Commission can 
aim to recruit officials either for entry-level positions or for more senior administrative grades. 
The literature on socialization in the EU administration suggests that this decision is based in part 
on concerns about the ability to socialize officials. For instance, Suvarierol et al. (2013) argue 
that some EU agencies target inexperienced recruits that can more easily be socialized into 
certain organizational norms, while other agencies prefer hiring more experienced staff whose 
work experience can contribute to the agency’s performance. Likewise, Ban argues that entry-
level officials are seen as more ‘malleable’ and are more quickly socialized into the norms of the 
European Commission (Ban 2013, p. 123). Given that socialization is a central concern in 
recruitment competitions for citizens from new member countries, we can expect the organization 
to hire new officials at the lowest possible level in order to increase its ability to socialize 
officials. Recruitment competitions for entry-level officials are in turn likely to put less emphasis 
on advanced educational qualifications and to focus less on specialist knowledge in tests. We 
therefore formulate hypotheses 3a and 3b:  
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Hypothesis 3a: The relationship between geographical representativeness and educational 
qualifications is (partly) mediated by administrative grade. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: The relationship between geographical representativeness and specialist content 
of tests is (partly) mediated by administrative grade. 
 
A second characteristic of the targeted recruits that can explain the negative relationship between 
geographical representativeness and specialist expertise is the field of the recruitment 
competition, which can generalist or specialist. A core tenet of the literature on professions is that 
specialists are committed to the norms and values of their specific professional group (Wilensky 
1964; Mintzberg 1979). This means that they partly adhere to standards of behavior defined 
outside the bureaucratic agency in which they work (Wilson 1989, pp. 59-60). Generalists, by 
contrast, can be expected to be more loyal to the interests and values of the organization. 
Suvarierol and colleagues make a similar argument for the EU administration, pointing out that 
generalists typically are more loyal to EU’s supranational norms, whereas specialist experts ‘are 
primarily guided by the rules, criteria and standards of the professional group to which they 
belong’ (Suvarierol et al. 2013, p. 920). In enlargement competitions, the socialization potential 
of candidates is arguably a central concern. We therefore expect that enlargement competitions to 
a larger extent will emphasize recruitment in generalist fields, since generalists are seen as more 
receptive to the organization’s norms. Competitions in generalist fields can in turn be expected to 
pay less attention to formal educational qualifications and to put less emphasis on specialist 
content in recruitment tests. We thus propose hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
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Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between geographical representativeness and educational 
qualifications is (partly) mediated by field of competition. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between geographical representativeness and specialist content 
of tests is (partly) mediated by field of competition. 
 
These hypotheses give rise to the following conceptual model (see figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Data collection 
We examine the issue of representativeness and knowledge in the EU bureaucracy through a 
quantitative analysis of recruitment competitions for the European Commission. The analysis is 
based on a dataset of competition notices, that is, public advertisements of upcoming recruitment 
competitions. Competition notices are legally binding documents that set out the modalities of the 
recruitment competitions, including the field of competition, the administrative grade of entry, 
the number of candidates to be recruited, eligibility and selection criteria, and the type of 
knowledge and skills tested. 
The population studied comprises open competitions organized during the period 1958-
2015 for entry to the European Commission and its forerunners as well as EPSO competitions 
intended for the European Commission. The analysis is restricted to competitions for recruitment 
of staff with policy tasks, which corresponds to the ‘administrator’ category of staff (i.e., ‘AD’ 
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level staff, previously ‘A’ level staff). For detailed information on how the dataset was compiled, 
see the appendix.  
Delimited in this way, the analysis encompasses 267 open competitions. After a listwise 
deletion of the competitions with missing values on the variables used in the analysis, the number 
of observations is 187. Below we discuss the variables we use in the analysis.  
 
Measures 
The aim of the analysis is to examine the relationship between geographical representation and 
the emphasis on specialized expertise in recruitment. Following Max Weber, specialized 
expertise can be identified with the possession of advanced educational qualifications and 
specialized knowledge. In the analysis, we use two measures to capture this underlying concept. 
The first is whether the assessment of candidates in the recruitment competition takes into 
account educational qualifications (beyond the minimum education required to take part in a 
competition), rather than being based exclusively on tests. This is an indicator of the emphasis 
placed on formal education in recruitment: In competitions based in full or in part on educational 
qualifications, the candidate’s level and type of education is considered (e.g., a PhD degree in 
economics may constitute an important advantage); in competitions based exclusively on tests, 
formal education beyond the minimum requirement is not considered. The first dependent 
variable educational qualifications is therefore a dummy variable that distinguishes between 
recruitment competitions that are based partly or fully on educational qualifications (1) and 
competitions that are based exclusively on tests (0). (See the appendix for further information 
about how the measures are constructed.) 
 The second measure of the emphasis on specialized expertise is to what extent recruitment 
tests assess specialist knowledge. The logic behind this measure is that even if recruitment 
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competitions do not base assessment on formal educational qualifications, they may still target 
specialized expertise by placing great emphasis on specialist knowledge in the tests. To get at the 
underlying concept, we therefore need to take both these aspects into account. The second 
dependent variable specialist content of tests is therefore the percentage of the tests that is 
devoted to assessing specialist knowledge. To ensure comparability, the analysis of this 
dependent variable is confined to test-only competitions (Educational qualifications  = 0).  
The main independent variable in the study is the presence of geographical 
representativeness criteria in the recruitment competition. This variable distinguishes between 
competitions where nationality was an explicit criterion, i.e., ‘enlargement competitions’ 
(geographical representativeness = 1), and competitions that did not take nationality into account, 
i.e., ‘regular competitions’ (geographical representativeness = 0). The former category includes 
all competitions that were open only to citizens from specific countries, whereas the latter 
category covers all competitions open to citizens from all member states. 
The variable administrative grade is included as a possible mediator in the relationship 
between enlargement competitions and the educational qualifications and test content of 
recruitment competitions. According to our theoretical argument, the prior work experience of 
recruits is a central factor in determining how amenable officials are to organizational 
socialization, with entry-level officials without prior work experience being more malleable than 
those with more experience. In the analysis, we therefore distinguish between competitions for 
entry-level officials (for which no prior work experience is required) (administrative grade = 0), 
and officials at higher grades (where prior work experience is required) (administrative grade = 
1). 
The second mediating variable is field of competition. The variable field of competition 
consists of 19 categories, including ‘general’, ‘public administration’, ‘law’ and ‘economics and 
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statistics’ (see appendix for full list). General competitions and competitions in general public 
administration are classified as ‘generalist’ (field of competition = 0). Competitions in all other 
fields are classified as ‘specialist’ (field of competition = 1). A single competition can recruit 
civil servants for multiple fields. Hence, the variable field is nested within competitions.  
To account for confounding effects that may arise from differences in the number of 
candidates to be recruited in competitions, we control for the size of the competition. The 
variable size of competition is measured as the number of candidates sought in a competition. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in table 1. The distribution of the 
variables over time are reported in the appendix.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
The correlations between the variables are displayed in table 2. The table shows that geographical 
representativeness is negatively correlated both with educational qualifications and specialist 
content of tests. Geographical representativeness is also negatively correlated with administrative 
grade and field of competition. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Analytical strategy 
From our conceptual model presented above, it follows that the effect of geographical 
representativeness on specialist qualifications and skills is mediated by administrative grade and 
field of competition. Figure 1 depicts the analytical model that results from our 
operationalization. We test the hypotheses by performing a mediation analysis according to the 
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Baron and Kenny procedure (Baron and Kenny 1986). This analysis is explained in detail in the 
appendix. 
 
RESULTS  
In this section, mediation analyses are presented to test the theoretical expectations outlined in the 
study’s conceptual model.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The indirect effect of geographical representativeness on educational qualifications 
Table 3 provides the estimates for the mediation analysis for educational qualifications. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that – without modeling the effects of administrative 
grade and field of competition – geographical representativeness has a negative effect on 
educational qualifications (b = -0.931; p < 0.05). This means that enlargement competitions are 
significantly less likely than regular competitions to assess candidates fully or partly on the basis 
of educational qualifications (beyond the minimum education required to take part in the 
competition). Whereas 62 percent of regular competitions are based fully or partly on educational 
qualifications, this is the case for only 18 percent of enlargement competitions. Moreover, we 
find that geographical representativeness has a negative effect on administrative grade (b = -
1.950; p < 0.001), meaning that enlargement competitions are less likely than regular 
competitions to target higher-level officials. We also observe a negative effect of geographical 
representativeness on field of competition (b = -1.062; p < 0.001), which implies that 
enlargement competitions are more likely than regular competitions to be organized in generalist 
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fields. In addition, administrative grade and field of competition both positively predict 
educational qualifications (b = 4.341; p < 0.001 and b = 0.610; p < 0.05, respectively). This 
implies that recruitment competitions for higher administrative grades and in specialist fields are 
more likely to include an assessment of educational qualifications. Finally, the significant effect 
of geographical representativeness (step 1) disappears when administrative grade and field are 
added to the model (b = -0.234; p = 0.656) (step 4). As expected, the control variable size of 
competition negatively predicts educational qualifications in all models, which means that 
competitions aimed at recruiting larger numbers of officials are less likely to consider educational 
qualifications. In all, the conditions for testing for mediation according to the Baron and Kenny 
procedure (1986) are met (see appendix). 
Although Table 3 illustrates several direct relationships, it does not provide information 
about the indirect effect of geographical representativeness on educational qualifications. 
Bootstrapping (N=5000) is used to test whether the indirect effect of geographical 
representativeness on educational qualifications is significant. Table 4 presents the bootstrapped 
indirect effects of geographical representativeness on educational qualifications. It shows that 
both the indirect effect through administrative grade (b = -0.345; p <0.001) and the indirect effect 
through field of competition (b = -0.020; p < 0.05) are negative and significant, and this is also 
the case for the total effect (b = -0.407; p < 0.05) and the total indirect effect (b = -0.365; p < 
0.001). The direct effect, however, is not statistically significant. The proportion of the total 
effect of geographical representativeness on educational qualifications that is mediated by 
administrative grade and field of competition is about 0.90, which means that the relationship is 
almost fully mediated. All in all, we find support for our expectations that geographical 
representativeness has a negative effect on educational qualifications (hypothesis 1) and that this 
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relationship is mediated by administrative grade (hypothesis 3a) and field of competition 
(hypothesis 4a). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
The indirect effect of geographical representativeness on specialist content of tests  
Our second mediation model predicts specialist content of tests. The results are presented in 
Table 5. As expected, we find that geographical representativeness has a negative effect on 
specialist content of tests (b = -9.586; p < 0.01). In other words, the share of specialist knowledge 
assessed in recruitment tests is significantly lower in enlargement competitions than in regular 
competitions. Whereas the average share of tests devoted to specialist knowledge is 31 percent in 
regular competitions, it is merely 22 percent in enlargement competitions. As in the previous 
model, geographical representativeness has a significant, negative effect on administrative grade 
and field of competition (b = 2.003; p < 0.001 and b = -0.790; p < 0.01, respectively). Field of 
competition, in turn, positively affects specialist content of tests (b = 7.687; p < 0.001). However, 
the effect of administrative grade on specialist content of tests is not significant (b = -2.367; p = 
0. 351). By adding both administrative grade and field of competition to the model, the negative 
effect of enlargement competition becomes stronger instead of weaker (b = -11.254; p < 0.001). 
The size of the competition has no significant effect on specialist content of tests. In all, the 
conditions for testing for mediation are not met.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
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Because the effect of administrative grade on specialist content of tests is not significant, we test 
the mediating effect of field of competition separately (see table 6). Without administrative grade, 
the effect of field of competition on specialist content of tests is significant and positive (b = 
7.310; p < 0.001). Moreover, the effect of geographical representativeness (step 1) decreases 
when field of competition is added to the model (b = -0.234; p = 0.656) (step 4). Hence, the effect 
of geographical representativeness could be partially mediated through field of competition. To 
test the indirect effect of geographical representativeness on specialist content of tests through 
field of competition, we perform bootstrapping (N=5000) (see table 7). We find that both the 
indirect and the direct effect of geographical representativeness are negative and significant (b = -
0.037;  p <0.01 and b = -0.322; p <0.001, respectively). The proportion of the total effect of 
geographical representativeness on specialist content of tests that is mediated through field of 
competition is about 0.10. Hence, we find support for the negative effect of geographical 
representativeness on specialist content of tests (hypothesis 2) and the mediating effect of field of 
competition (hypothesis 4b). The data provide no evidence for the mediating effect of 
administrative grade (hypothesis 3b).  
To assess the robustness of our findings, we also estimated all models with the year of the 
competition as an additional control variable, in order to control for any over-time variation 
driven by omitted variables. The results of the additional analyses are comparable to the results 
presented here (results of the extra analyses are not reported here but are available on request).  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The analysis provides empirical evidence for a negative relationship between geographical 
representativeness and specialist expertise in the recruitment policies of the European 
Commission. We find a negative and significant relationship between the presence of 
representativeness criteria and two key measures of the emphasis on specialist knowledge in 
recruitment: the use of educational qualifications to assess candidates and the emphasis on 
specialist knowledge in recruitment tests. Moreover, we show that this relationship was mediated 
by the defined field of recruitment (for both measures) and by the administrative grade for which 
new entrants were sought (for the use of educational qualifications). In other words, enlargement 
competitions put less emphasis on specialist qualifications and knowledge, and were more 
frequently targeted at generalist fields and entry-level positions, than regular recruitment 
competitions. Thus, while geographical representation among Commission staff may have 
contributed positively to the legitimacy of the organization and to certain aspects of its 
performance, it entailed less emphasis on specialized expertise in the recruitment of staff. 
 The findings also provide tentative support for the causal mechanism we propose to 
explain this relationship, namely the greater perceived need of the organization to socialize 
officials from the new member states (cf. Ban 2013; Christensen 2015). The greater emphasis in 
enlargement competitions on recruitment for entry-level positions and in generalist fields is 
consistent with a concern with making new entrants fit the organizational mold. To be sure, we 
lack qualitative evidence to prove that socialization concerns determined the design of 
recruitment policies. Yet, we see it as plausible that the Commission actors in charge of 
recruitment policies – first DG Personnel and Administration and later the Commission 
representative on the EPSO Management Board – would be concerned about the issue. Also, we 
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see it as plausible that Commission leaders made conscious, strategic decisions about how to deal 
with the recruitment challenges arising from major events such as EU enlargements – including 
what kind of skills and knowledge to ask of officials from new member states. For instance, 
Carolyn Ban shows that the Commission made extensive preparations for the selection and 
integration of new staff in relation to the Eastern enlargement in the 2000s (Ban 2013). More 
generally, the importance of socialization in the European institutions has been highlighted in a 
number of existing EU studies (e.g. Beyers 2010; Suvarierol et al. 2013).  
There are of course other possible explanations for the lower emphasis on specialist 
qualifications in enlargement competitions. One alternative explanation is that more practical 
concerns related to selecting large numbers of new officials led to more generic recruitment tests. 
Yet, we address this possibility by controlling for the size of the recruitment competition in the 
analysis. While competition size is a significant predictor of the reliance on educational 
qualifications in recruitment, it does not cancel out the effect of geographical representation or 
the mediating variables. Another possibility is that recruiting officials from new member states in 
generic categories made it easier to fill open positions in the Commission. However, whereas this 
would be true for some positions, recruitment of candidates with generic skills would make it 
more difficult to fill posts requiring specific competences. Third, the lower emphasis on 
specialized expertise in enlargement competitions could be attributed to the anticipation of 
differences in the profile of applicants. For instance, the variety of educational systems in the new 
member states could have led the Commission to rely less on university degrees in recruitment. 
Yet, we would have expected this to be compensated by a greater emphasis on assessing 
specialist knowledge through tests. Instead, our analysis shows that enlargement competitions put 
less emphasis on specialist content in tests. In addition, some would argue that the diminished 
attention to specialist skills reflects broader trends in human resource management towards the 
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assessment of general ‘competences’ rather than expert knowledge (cf. Lodge and Hood 2005). 
However, this cannot explain the lower emphasis on specialist knowledge during enlargement, 
since ‘competence’-based selection procedures were introduced only in 2010, that is, after the 
completion of the special recruitment competitions related to Eastern enlargement (Ban 2010).  
A final consideration concerns whether our findings are specific to particular rounds of 
European enlargement. Following our socialization argument, one could argue that the large 
differences between existing and new member states during Eastern enlargement would entail a 
relatively greater perceived need for socialization and, in turn, relatively less emphasis on 
specialized knowledge, as compared to previous rounds of enlargements. The limited number of 
observations in the population of recruitment competitions does not allow us to test for 
differences between the various enlargement rounds. However, the robustness check that we 
perform – controlling for year of competition – shows that the negative relationship between 
representativeness and specialist expertise is independent from the period in which the 
competition took place, which suggests that the relationship is not specific to Eastern 
enlargement. 
 It is important to emphasize that our findings only concern what qualifications and 
knowledge are asked for in recruitment competitions. The analysis does not allow us to say 
whether officials recruited based on geographical representativeness actually had lower 
educational qualifications or specialist knowledge than others. There are reasons why this may 
not be the case, such as the ability to tap into a broader pool of qualified candidates when 
expanding the geographical scope of recruitment and the greater attractiveness of the terms of 
employment in the Commission for citizens from new member states. While systematic analyses 
are missing, some studies of the EU’s Eastern enlargement suggest that officials recruited from 
the new member states generally were well educated (Ban 2013, p. 106; Kassim et al. 2013). At 
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the same time, the way an organization recruits its staff is bound to influence the role 
identification of officials (Ban 2010; Christensen 2015). As such, a selection procedure that 
emphasizes generalist skills over specialist qualifications and knowledge sends a clear signal to 
new entrants about the kind of competences that are valued by the organization and the kind of 
role officials are expected to play. 
 Based on this, the need to ensure fair national bureaucratic representation in an expanded 
European Union can be seen as one explanation for the increasingly generalist character of the 
European Commission. Several recent studies of the Commission paint a picture of an 
organization where generalist skills and the ability to deal with a broad range of policy issues is 
valued over advanced expertise in specific fields (Wille 2013; Suvarierol et al. 2013). Often, this 
trend is ascribed to the administrative reforms of the early 2000s, which included requirements 
for regular staff rotation (Ban 2013, p. 94; Wille 2013, p. 129). Yet, our analysis suggests that 
this development may also be rooted in the successive rounds of EU enlargement, which have 
implied a greater emphasis on generalist skills (see also Christensen 2015). These findings also 
raise questions about the broader impact of geographical representation on the EU’s 
administrative system. 
 Another contribution of this study is that it extends the debate about representative 
bureaucracy in international organizations (cf. Gravier 2008, 2013). Our argument addresses a 
key challenge faced by international organizations, namely how to ensure both fair national 
representation and specialized expertise in their administration. To be sure, the extent to which 
international administrations strive for geographical representativeness varies, depending on 
features such as the scope of the organization and its governance structures. The EU is a special 
case in this regard, given that it is a broad multi-purpose organization with a highly developed 
executive bureaucracy endowed with considerable political powers. Yet, other organizations, 
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such as the United Nations, also have large permanent administrations and face strong 
expectations about fair representation. Moreover, the relationship between geographical 
representation and specialized expertise may vary across international organizations, depending 
on their recruitment system and the need to manufacture a common organizational culture. For 
instance, organizations where recruits are pre-socialized into a common professional culture may 
be less concerned about socializing new officials than the European Commission. A more far-
reaching application of arguments about representative bureaucracy would also investigate other 
forms of representation (gender, race or sexual orientation) in international bureaucracies, as well 
as the effects of representation on the effectiveness and legitimacy of these organizations 
(Groeneveld et al. 2016). 
 Even though the precise scope of the relationship between representation and specialist 
expertise needs to be explored further, the central argument of this article about the potential 
negative relationship between the two constitutes a novel contribution to the representative 
bureaucracy literature. While this literature so far has focused mainly on the positive effects of 
representation in public bureaucracies on legitimacy and organizational performance, this article 
suggests that there may be trade-offs between representation and other important concerns in 
public administration (Lim 2006; Kennedy 2014). Our argument about the implications of 
representation for specialized expertise in public organizations opens up a new front in this 
discussion. Given the importance of skills-based bureaucratic recruitment for the quality of 
government (Dahlström et al. 2012), the expertise of officials is an issue that needs to be taken 
seriously in the literature on representative bureaucracy. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
 
  
37 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  for all variables in the analysis 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Educational qualifications (fully or partly based on educational qualifications = 1) 187 .294 .457 0 1 
Specialist content of tests† 130 26.523 14.000 0 66.5 
Geographical representativeness (enlargement competitions = 1) 187 .385 .488 0 1 
Administrative grade (officials at high grades = 1) 187 .658 .476 0 1 
Field of competition (specialist = 1) 413 .826 .380 0 1 
Size of competition 187 79.594  83.582  2 475 
Note. † Specialist content of tests if educational qualifications = 0. 
 
 
Table 2. Correlations for all variables in the analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(1) Educational qualifications (fully or partly based on educational qualifications = 1) 1.000      
(2) Specialist content of tests† . 1.000     
(3) Geographical representativeness (enlargement competitions = 1) -.421* -.319* 1.000    
(4) Administrative grade (officials at high grades = 1) .830* .106 -.571* 1.000   
(5) Field of competition (specialist = 1) .288 .219* -.325* .323* 1.000  
(6) Size of competition -.350* .020 -.073 -.249* -.058 1.000 
Note. Tetrachoric correlations for dichotomous variables; † Specialist content of tests if educational qualifications = 0; * p<0.05 
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Table 3. Mediation analysis for educational qualifications; logistic regression  
 
Educational 
qualifications 
(step 1) 
Administrative 
grade  
(step 2) 
Field of 
competition 
(step 2) 
Educational 
qualifications 
(step 3) 
Educational 
qualifications 
(step 4) 
 
b/se b/se b/se b/se    b/se    
Geographical representativeness (enlargement competitions = 1) -0.931* -1.950*** -1.062***              -0.234    
 
(0.460) (0.424) (0.224)              (0.525)    
Administrative grade (officials at high grades = 1)    4.341*** 4.256*** 
 
   (1.048) (1.109)    
Field of competition (specialist = 1)    0.610* 0.530*   
 
   (0.287) (0.261)    
Size of competition -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.002** -0.013** -0.013**  
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)    
Constant 0.735* 2.871*** 2.440*** -4.392*** -4.100**    
 
(0.339) (0.414) (0.234) (0.457) (0.447)    
chi2 14.778 31.119 25.342 28.362 34.142 
Df 2 2 2 3 4 
Pseudo R2 .152 .188 .041 .296    .298    
N Competitions 187 187 187 187 187 
N Fields 413 413 413 413 413 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
39 
 
Table 4. Bootstrapping indirect effects of geographical representativeness on educational qualifications via 
administrative grade and field of competition 
 Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrap Std. 
Err. 
z P>z Normal-based [90% 
Conf. Interval] 
Indirect effect through 
administrative grade  
-.345 .065 -5.29 .000 -.452  -.238 
Indirect effect through field of 
competition  
-.020 .010 -1.99 .046 -.037 -.004 
Total indirect effect -.365 .068 -5.40 .000 -.476 -.254 
Direct effect -.042 .103 -.41 .684 -.211      .127 
Total effect -.407 .105 -3.88 .000 -.579 -.234 
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Table 5. Mediation analysis for specialist content of tests; logistic and OLS regression 
 Specialist content 
of tests 
(step 1) 
Administrative 
grade  
(step 2) 
Field of 
competition 
 (step 2) 
Specialist content 
of tests 
 (step 3) 
Specialist content 
of tests 
 (step 4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Geographical representativeness (enlargement competitions = 1) -9.586** -2.003*** -.790**  -11.254*** 
 (3.029) (.472) (.242)  (3.260)    
Administrative grade (officials at high grades = 1)    -2.367 -6.361*   
    (2.530) (2.477)    
Field of competition (specialist = 1)    7.687*** 6.423*** 
    (1.629) (1.769)    
Size of competition -.013 -.010*** -.001 -.003 -.022    
 (.014) (.003) (.001) (.009) (.014)    
Constant 32.190*** 2.195*** -1.970*** 20.580*** 32.257*** 
 (3.225) (.481) (.258) (2.815) (3.338)    
Pseudo R2  .155 .021               
R2 .113   .055 .187    
Adjusted R2 .107   .045 .176    
N Competitions 130 130 130 130 130 
N Fields 293 293 293 293 293  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6. Mediation analysis for specialist content of tests; logistic and OLS regression 
 Specialist content 
of tests 
(step 1) 
Field of 
competition 
 (step 2) 
Specialist content 
of tests 
 (step 3) 
Specialist content 
of tests 
 (step 4) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Geographical representativeness 
(enlargement competitions = 1) 
-9.586** -.790**  -8.869**  
 (3.029) (.242)  (3.018)    
Field of competition (specialist = 1)   7.310*** 5.815*** 
   (1.692) (1.688)    
Size of competition -.013 -.001 -.000 -.012    
 (.014) (.001) (.010) (.014)    
Constant 32.190*** 1.970*** 19.403*** 27.038*** 
 (3.225) (.258) (2.145) (3.597)    
Pseudo R2  .021                
R2 .113  .048 .143    
Adjusted R2 .107  .041 .134    
N Competitions 130 130 130 130 
N Fields 293 293 293 293 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Table 7. Bootstrapping indirect effects of geographical representativeness on specialist content of tests via field 
of competition 
 Observed 
Coef. 
Bootstrap Std. 
Err. 
z P>z Normal-based [90% 
Conf. Interval] 
Indirect effect through field of 
competition  
-.037 .014 -2.67 .008 -.059 -.014 
Direct effect -.322 .088 -3.65 .000 -.467      -.177 
Total effect -.358 .087 -4.10 .000 -.502 -.215 
 
      
      
 
 
